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Problem area 
The Smart Bandits project, a National Technology Project funded 
by the Ministry of Defence, aims at developing intelligent 
humanlike Computer Generated Forces (CGFs) in order to 
improve the training value in tactical air combat simulators and to 
reduce costs of such training.  
Important cognitive abilities for intelligent tactical behaviour are 
Situation Awareness and the ability to be surprised. These 
abilities have been modelled using cognitive computational 
modelling and have been implemented in CGFs representing 
opponent fighter pilots. However, these models have not yet 
been tested against human pilots. This report deals with the 
evaluation of the realism and usefulness of these models for 
training purposes. 
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Description of work 
This paper describes modelling and validating 
the aforementioned human cognitive abilities 
in three steps. 
First, a computational model has been 
developed that represents the situation 
awareness of a virtual fighter pilot during a 
tactical mission. The model activates 
observations and ‘beliefs’ about the current 
situation. The belief activation process allows 
the virtual pilot to resolve events that might 
happen in the near future during the mission. 
Second, a computational model has been 
developed with which surprise intensity and its 
effect on behaviour can be generated. This 
allows the virtual pilot to behave ‘naturally’ in 
situations that would be surprising for real 
pilots. 
Third, during evaluation trials, four human 
pilots have been confronted with training 
scenarios in which these virtual pilots acted as 
opponents. Questionnaires have been used to 
measure the usefulness of such opponents 
and the realism of their behaviour. 
 
Results and conclusions 
Results indicate that computer-controlled 
opponents with the integrated SA/Surprise 
model are challenging and realistic enough to 
include in tactical training for operational 
pilots. The surprise effect in the virtual 
opponent was indeed recognizable by the 
human pilots. In contrast, the human pilots 
found it less straightforward to judge the 
quality of the SA of their opponents. 
 
Applicability 
In the future, simulators will play an 
increasingly important role in the training of 
fighter pilots. Credible and challenging 
opponent behaviour is essential to improve 
the quality of the training. Simulation of 
opponents requires expertise that is not 
always available in training organisations. 
Realism of virtual opponents in simulations 
should therefore be improved in order to meet 
tactical training objectives, and therewith 
increasing the training value of tactical 
simulation. 
Artificial Intelligence based on cognitive 
models can be applied in settings that require 
realistic human behaviour from virtual actors. 
In addition to tactical mission training, such 
simulation of humans can be used for mission 
preparation, doctrine development and to 
determine the optimal actions in the 
battlefield given specific military situations. 
The models can also be used in serious games, 
not necessarily restricted to a military setting 
(e.g. in crisis management).  
Although the Situational Awareness module in 
the virtual opponents could be further 
improved, the pilots from the Royal 
Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) that 
participated in the evaluation were generally 
positive on the practical usefulness of the 
agents equipped with such cognitive models. 
Once the cognitive models, as described in this 
paper, are improved and tailored for general 
use (i.e. not specifically for Fighter 4-ship), it 
will help the RNLAF to improve the 
effectiveness of their simulator training. 
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Summary 
Intelligent, human-like computer-controlled opponents could improve the training value (in 
terms of realism and cost-effectiveness) of tactical training simulators for fighter pilots. To create 
such opponents, realistic computational cognitive models are needed. This paper presents the 
evaluation of an integrated computational cognitive model that has been developed to simulate 
Situation Awareness (SA) and the ability to be surprised. The crucial element in the integrated 
model is a mechanism that matches beliefs about the situation from the SA submodel with 
expectations about the world from the surprise submodel. 
To evaluate its use and realism for the domain, the integrated SA/Surprise model was 
implemented in an existing (research) simulator for F-16 fighter pilots at Volkel Air Force Base in 
the Netherlands. The model was evaluated by four operational fighter pilots in the simulator. 
Each pilot flew five scenarios against two opponents equipped with the integrated SA/Surprise 
model, each scenario with different settings for SA and surprise. The SA of the opponent was 
either full or reduced and the ‘being surprised’ ability of the opponent was either activated or 
deactivated. 
Results indicate that computer-controlled opponents with the integrated SA/Surprise model 
contribute to a challenging and realistic training environment value and could therefore be 
included in tactical training for operational pilots. The surprise effect in the virtual opponent was 
indeed recognizable by the human pilots. The human pilots found it less straightforward to judge 
the quality of the SA of their opponents. 
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1 Introduction 
Tactical training of fighter pilots in simulators is widely used to complement ‘live’ flying exercises. 
An essential feature of tactical training in simulators is the presence of multiple actors in the 
training scenario: other fighters in the formation, supporting forces, neutral forces, and/or 
enemy forces in the air or on the ground.  
Some of these actors in the simulation may be controlled by humans (instructors or specially 
trained staff) and others may be controlled by agents. This research focuses on using agents 
mimicking the pilots of adversary fighter aircraft, removing the need to use experts (which are 
expensive and scarce) to play this role.   
Modern fighter aircraft are capable of air operations in complex theatres-of-war, where highly 
manoeuvrable aircraft (at opposing sides, referred to as ‘blue’ and ‘red’) are equipped with 
guided missiles. The pilot is able to fire these missiles at the opponent at long range, far beyond 
visual detection distance, primarily using the radar for target tracking and missile guidance. Both 
sides are also equipped with a so called radar warning receiver that provides a warning when it 
receives radar radiation from the opponent. The intricacy of the game created by highly 
manoeuvrable aircraft with powerful weapons and sensors and highly skilled humans in control, 
sets high standards on the behaviour that agents used in tactical air combat simulation should 
exhibit. 
Four grades in sophistication of CGF-behaviour may be distinguished [10], from simple to 
complex: 
-  Non-responsive behaviour, which follows a pre-determined action sequence, with no 
capability to observe or react to the environment. 
-  Stimulus-Response (S-R) behaviour, in which the CGF, in response to a certain set of stimuli 
from the environment, always exhibits a consistent behaviour. 
-  Delayed Response (DR) behaviour, in which the CGF not only takes into account a current set 
of stimuli from the environment, but also stimuli from previous moments, which are stored 
in the CGF’s memory.  
-  Motivation-based behaviour, in which CGF combines not only S-R and DR behaviour but also 
takes its motivational states into account. These motivational states are the result of internal 
processes and may represent goals, assumptions, expectations, biological and emotive 
states.  
State-of-the-art CGFs primarily exhibit behaviour of the two lowest grades. Abdellaoui, Taylor 
and Parkinson [1] reviewed the Artificial Intelligence capabilities of currently available CGFs and 
concluded that these CGFs lack both anticipatory and emergent behaviour, i.e. they are unable to 
predict others’ intent and unable to produce behaviour with a complexity beyond the simple 
constituent components.  
Also, with such state-of-the-art CGFs, it will be difficult to mimic sophisticated human-like 
behaviour. Such behaviour would more likely be facilitated by modelling internal processes, 
based on theoretical insights from cognitive psychology. 
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This Technical Publication evaluates representations of two presumably important internal 
processes in CGFs representing fighter pilots, namely (1) Situation Awareness (SA), and (2) the 
ability to be surprised.  
SA allows for effective decision making [4]. Especially in demanding circumstances, as 
experienced during air combat, a reduction in a person’s SA can seriously degrade performance. 
Assuming that SA is important, or even essential, for human decision making, this process should 
be modelled in the development of agents designed to display motivation-based human-like 
behaviour. 
Surprise is considered an adaptive, evolutionary-based reaction to unexpected events with 
emotional and cognitive aspects (for example [3], [9], and [11]). Experiencing surprise has some 
effects on human behaviour, for example, the interruption of ongoing action [6]. The 
phenomenon of surprise is highly relevant for the military domain. Indeed, the element of 
surprise is considered an important factor in military operations by many military experts. 
Strategists such as Sun Tzu, F.C. Fuller and John Boyd have stressed the advantages of surprising 
the enemy (see e.g. [8]). 
An integrated model that incorporates both SA and the ability to be surprised has been 
developed in an earlier phase of the Smart Bandits project, and is reported by Bosse, Merk and 
Treur in [14].  
 
This Technical Publication (TP) describes the evaluation of this model in a simulated environment 
for internal validity and for practical application in a tactical fighter simulator. This evaluation 
thus focuses on the perceived realism of the tactical behaviour and the training value for fighter 
pilots of the intelligent agents in training scenario. 
As a necessary condition for this validation, it is important that the SA and Surprise submodels 
are appropriately parameterised, that is, that the used belief networks contain the appropriate 
observations, beliefs and weight factors.  
For this purpose, an SA model was previously developed by Hoogendoorn, Lambalgen and Treur 
[5] in the context of the Smart Bandits project. The SA model, that is based on Endsley’s [4] three 
phases of Situation Awareness, was tested in isolation, using relatively simple air-to-air scenarios. 
In a later stage of the project, Bosse, Merk and Treur [5] improved this SA model to allow the CGF 
to make qualitative time references (through introducing beliefs about past, current and future 
events). The latter, improved, SA model formed the basis for the integrated SA/Surprise model 
described in [14]. 
Likewise, the Surprise submodel was previously developed and tested in the context of the Smart 
Bandits project by Merk [7]. The model was tested in a historical case from the domain of air 
combat and its behavioural properties were evaluated before being incorporated in the 
integrated SA/Surprise model as described in [14]. 
 
The first part of this TP describes this integrated model. In order to examine the parameters and 
the qualities of the belief networks of the SA submodel, the surprise submodel and the 
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integrated SA/Surprise model in more detail, the reader is referred to [5], [7] and [14] 
respectively.  
The second part of this TP evaluates the utility and realism of the integrated model for the 
tactical training domain. For this purpose, an air-to-air scenario was developed that included 
virtual opponents furnished with the integrated SA/Surprise model. These opponents, flying their 
fighter aircraft, were validated in an existing simulator facility. Four operational F-16 fighter pilots 
at Volkel Air Force Base in the Netherlands flew several sorties against these opponents. Results 
are analysed and discussed. 
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2 The Model 
In this section the integrated agent model for situation awareness and surprise is described in 
more detail. The integrated model attempts to abstract the complex processes associated with 
SA and surprise using relatively simple calculations. This does not imply that the functioning of 
the human mind is based on such calculations, neither is it implied that basic processes, for 
example at the neural level, are represented by the model. However, the model attempts to 
bring about agent behaviour, at the level of tactical simulation (on a timescale of second and 
minutes), in a relatively parsimonious way. 
 
2.1 The Situation Awareness submodel 
 
Situation awareness is represented in the model by dynamically generated and updated sets of 
observations and beliefs (cf. [2]). The observations represent the input the agent receives from 
its environment. Observations are represented in the form  
observation(A:AGENT,  W:WORLD_INFO, C: REAL)  
 
where the first argument is the owner A of the observation of the type AGENT. For example, 
variable A can obtain the value red1. The second argument is the world info W concerning the 
observation. WORLD_INFO is the set of all possible phenomena that an agent is able to observe. 
For example, variable W can take the value heading(blue1, 180). The third argument C is a real 
value [0, 1] representing the certainty of the owner A that the world info W really holds.  
Beliefs are represented in the form  
belief(A:AGENT, W:WORLD_INFO, AV: REAL, T:TIME)  
 
where the first argument A is the owner of the belief. The second argument W concerns the 
world info with which the belief is concerned. The third argument AV is the activation value [0, 1] 
of that belief, of which the use and calculation will be explained later. The fourth argument T 
concerns the time [past, present, future, always] for which the owner A believes that the world 
info W hold. For example, belief(red1, heading(blue, 180), 0.7, future) would represent the belief 
of agent red1 that blue will fly southward in the future with an activation value of 0.7. 
Generation of beliefs makes use of an underlying mental model. This is a network of observations 
and beliefs where connections have strengths indicated by a real number in the interval [0, 1]; 
along these connections activation is spread throughout the network. A connection has a source 
observation or belief and a destination belief. Activation is spread from the source via the 
connection to the destination belief. 
Updating the beliefs consists of three phases (cf. [2]): perception, comprehension and projection.  
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-  In the perception phase, the certainties of observations are determined and used to 
derive the activation values of those beliefs directly connected with the observations.  
-  In the comprehension phase, the activation values of beliefs on the present and the past 
are updated.  
-  In the projection phase, the activation values of beliefs for the future are updated.  
Each of the three phases has a time limit which determines how much time the update process 
for that phase may take. These three time limits model the phenomenon that humans under 
time pressure take shortcuts in their reasoning and have degraded situation awareness. 
 
2.1.1 Perception 
In the perception stage, the certainty values of the observations are used to calculate the 
activation values of a subset of beliefs on the current situation, those connected directly with 
observations. Currently, it is assumed that an observation is only connected to one belief. The 
belief activation update formula for perception is as follows: 
 
VB(t+t) = VB(t) + [B (th(, , VO(t)) - VB(t)) - B VB(t)] t   (1) 
 
Here the symbols mean: 
B The belief for which the activation value is calculated. 
O The parent observation of B. 
B The update speed parameter (how fast recent updates 
 influence the activation value) for B. 
B  The decay parameter for B 
VB(t) The previous activation value of B. 
VO(t) The certainty value of observation O. 
th(, , VO(t)) The threshold function, with parameters  (steepness), and τ (threshold value ). 
 
 
The continuous logistic threshold function used is as follows: 
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Here the symbols mean: 
 Steepness parameter 
 Threshold parameter 
V Input value 
 
2.1.2 Comprehension 
In the comprehension phase, the activation values of all the beliefs on the present situation are 
updated. A belief is updated exactly once during a cycle of perception, comprehension and 
projection. To ensure that the update of a belief is based on the most recent information, a belief 
is only updated if all its parent beliefs are updated; the belief graph is assumed to have no cycles. 
In each iteration, a belief is selected to be updated. For this belief, all the incoming connections 
that come from an active belief are used to update the activation value of the selected belief. The 
selected belief is marked as considered and the next iteration starts. This continues until either 
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the time limit of the comprehension phase is reached or all beliefs on the present and past are 
updated. The calculation of the activation value of a belief B is done by using only those 
connections whose source belief has an activation value higher than the minimal activation value. 
This models the phenomenon that activation only spreads from beliefs that have some degree of 
activation. 
The update function for belief activation is as follows.  
 
VB(t+t) = VB(t) +  
[B (th(, , Cg(B) C,B VC(t)) - VB(t)) - B VB(t)] t   (3) 
 
B  The belief for which the activation value is calculated. 
B  The update speed parameter (how fast recent  
updates influence the activation value) for B. 
B   The decay parameter for B 
VB(t)  The previous activation value of B. 
VO(t)  The certainty value of observation O. 
th(, , VO(t)) The threshold function, with parameters  (steepness), τ (threshold value for 
B). 
g(B)  The set of beliefs C connected to belief B as destination 
C  A belief from the set g(B). 
C,B  The strength of connection from C to B. 
 
2.1.3 Projection 
If the time limit has not been reached, the projection stage is started. In projection, beliefs on the 
future are updated. The process is the same as with beliefs on current situation, only with a 
different start set of beliefs.  
 
2.2 The Surprise submodel 
In the surprise model (adopted from [7]), events in the environment are continually monitored 
and evaluated. This evaluation consists of determining the degree of expectation disconfirmation 
[12], how important the event is to the subject and how novel the event is. This evaluation is 
used to generate the surprise intensity. As the evaluation happens continually, there is a surprise 
intensity value at any moment. The outcome of the evaluation aggregates expectation 
disconfirmation, event importance and event novelty, which are each represented by a real value 
between 0 and 1. Expectation disconfirmation measures the degree of discrepancy between the 
expectations of the agent and the actual observed events. The higher this value, the more 
unexpected the event is to the agent. Event importance measures the impact the event has on 
the goals and desires the agent has. A higher importance indicates that the event has relative far-
reaching consequences for the agent. Event novelty gives an indication of how familiar an event 
is, how often the agent has experienced this situation before. A mechanism that links the agent’s 
episodic memory on similar previous experiences with the observed event is needed for 
generating the value for event novelty. 
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Surprise intensity is calculated in a dynamic manner: the rate of change or derivative is calculated 
and this rate of change is then used to update the current surprise intensity value. This rate of 
change is called the delta surprise intensity in the model. The influences that determine surprise 
intensity identified in the previous section are used in the calculation of delta surprise intensity. 
The expectation disconfirmation, event importance and event novelty are the factors that 
increase surprise intensity. Decrease of surprise intensity is based on a decay parameter. The 
calculation of surprise intensity can then be informally described as follows: 
 
if  the surprise intensity at time t has value si  
and the delta surprise intensity has value dsi,   
then  at t+t the surprise intensity will have the value si + dsi t 
 
The value for the delta surprise intensity is determined as follows: 
 
If  at time t the surprise intensity has value si,  
and  there is an expectation disconfirmation with value ed, the importance and novelty of the 
 currently observed events have respectively the values i and n,  
and the weights for importance and novelty have values wi and wn   
and  the decay parameter has value   
then at time t the delta surprise intensity has value  
 (1 - si) ∙ ed ∙ (wi ∙ i + wn ∙ n) -  si  
 
 
More formally: 
 
dsi(t) = (1- si(t)) ·ed(t) ·(wi ·i(t) + wn · n(t) ) – ζ·si(t)   (4) 
 
As formula (4) is an important part of the model, we will examine it in more detail. The 
expectation disconfirmation ed is multiplied with the sum of the importance and novelty factors 
that are themselves multiplied with their weight values. The reason for this construction consists 
of two assumptions:  
1 .  Without expectation disconfirmation ed, there is no surprise. Hence, ed is the main 
factor causing the surprise intensity si. 
2 .  The sole effect of Importance i and novelty n is that they modify the surprise intensity si, 
under the condition that there is a (non-zero) expectation disconfirmation ed. For 
example, observing an important event (i>0) that has been expected (ed=0) should not 
lead to surprise. 
To ensure that si(t) + dsi(t) are kept within the domain [0, 1],  i, n and ed must also be kept 
within the domain [0,1] and the weights wi and wn must add up to 1.   
 
2.2.1 Effects of Surprise in Behaviour  
Although surprise is essential as an internal mechanism to detect when Situation Awareness is 
not accurately representing reality, the immediate effect of surprise is to change behaviour to be 
less optimal in regards of achieving the goals. This is the result of two effects. First, surprises 
trigger confused and shocked behaviour when the surprise level is high enough. Second, surprises 
slow down the normal cognitive functions to maintain situation awareness, such that responses 
are delayed.  
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2.3 Integrating the Situation Awareness and Surprise Model 
Integration of the situation awareness model and the surprise model (see fig. 1) uses an 
interaction between the models involving determination of the expectation disconfirmation 
value ed. This is done in the first place by specification of which situations (co-occurrences of 
beliefs) are considered as expectation disconfirmation. 
In the general surprise model as described in [7] certain aspects were left unspecified, as meant 
to be added for specific applications of the model. In the model described in the current paper, 
these aspects have been expanded upon to obtain a more specialized model. In particular, the 
aspects of sensemaking (as described in [12]), expectation disconfirmation and novelty have been 
specified in the current model. These three aspects will be explained in the next sections. 
 
2.3.1 Sensemaking 
Sensemaking can be viewed as the process in which the mental picture of the situation is aligned 
with the perception of reality. Based on the original paper of Stiensmeier-Pelster et al [12], it is 
assumed here that sensemaking refers de-facto to the concept of maintaining SA as defined by 
Endsley [4]. This is already implied by the SA model described in this paper by means of belief 
derivation: the derivation of new beliefs on the basis of other beliefs, following specific rules. 
 
2.3.2 Expectation disconfirmation 
Expectation disconfirmation is modelled as ‘belief inconsistency’. The surprise model is a meta-
reasoning process that monitors the situation awareness for inconsistent beliefs.  The definition 
of an inconsistent belief is that the agent believes that some X is true (or has been true, or will be 
Fig. 1: Overview of the integrated model. 
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true), but then forms the opposite belief. To determine a value of expectation disconfirmation for 
an event or observation, two elements are needed:  
First, beliefs on the world are needed. It is assumed that these beliefs are available in the form: 
 
 
belief(A:AGENT, W:WORLD_INFO, AV: REAL, T:TIME) 
 
 
where the first argument A is the owner of the belief, the second argument W the world info the 
belief is about, the third argument AV the activation level of the belief, and the fourth argument 
T for what time the agent holds that belief. While the Situation Awareness model described in [2] 
is used to supply these beliefs in this paper, any model that generates beliefs with an activation 
value and a temporal value can be used for supplying the beliefs. 
Second, to determine expectation disconfirmation a set of disconfirmation specifications is 
needed. These specifications determine which combinations of beliefs are inconsistent and to 
which extent: what expectation disconfirmation value the inconsistency creates. For example, an 
expectation disconfirmation arises when an event (world info) W2 happens before W1, while it 
was expected that W1 happens before W2. This is represented as follows: 
 
 
belief(A, W1, AV1, future),  
belief(A, W2, AV2, present),  
belief(A, before(W1, W2) , AV3, always) 
 expectation_disconfirmation(f(AV1, AV2, AV3)). 
 
 
With the set of beliefs supplied by the situation awareness model and a set of disconfirmation 
specifications given, the surprise model can generate expectation disconfirmation values.  
 
2.3.3 Novelty 
The ‘novelty value’ of a potential surprising event or observation depends on (the lack of) earlier 
experiences of similar events or observations. Hence, novelty is a measurement of how familiar 
the events that lead to surprise are. Such earlier experiences are represented by beliefs 
concerning the past. An event or observation is attributed a higher novelty value when the earlier 
experiences are fewer. 
 
The aforementioned set of disconfirmation specifications will also be used in determining the 
novelty value for an event or observation. The novelty value calculation takes into account 
whether events or observations in the aforementioned set have already appeared in the past.  
 
If two beliefs on world information W1, one with timestamp past and the other with timestamp 
present,  are active in an applicable disconfirmation specification, their activation values are used 
to determine the novelty value of the accompanying event or observation.  
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Any beliefs in an applicable disconfirmation specification with a past or always time label are 
ignored for calculating the novelty value. Because there is only one timestamp for beliefs on past 
events, we cannot further determine the temporal order of past beliefs. Therefore, it is not 
possible to determine previous experiences of past beliefs. For multiple beliefs about the 
present, the novelty is determined using a monotonically increasing aggregate function f of the 
individual values (in this case a weighted sum of novelty values). If n1, …, nk are the values of 
novelty for the different beliefs on the present in a given disconfirmation specification, then f(n1, 
…, nk) is the aggregate novelty value for this disconfirmation specification at that point in time. 
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3 Model evaluation 
3.1 Participants 
Four male operational F-16 pilots from the Royal Netherlands Air Force, aged 37, 36, 29 and 24 
and operational experience ranging from 1 to 14 years participated in the evaluation. These 
participants participated after being selected by the squadron commander on the basis of their 
scheduled availability during the evaluation period.  
 
3.2 Task 
The task for the F-16 fighter pilot was to fly a defensive counter-air mission as a ‘single ship’
1
, 
defending an important building (the objective) against air attack by two virtual opponents. 
These opponents are expected to enter the area to be defended from the direction of the front-
line. Along the frontline, Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) sites are located to help the F-16 to defend 
the area (see fig.8.2.). These SAM sites will shoot at any (virtual) opponent that will come within 
a range of 18 km. However, the virtual opponents will be able to detect most of the SAM sites 
because these are continuously using radar to survey the airspace, and the radiation emitted by 
the radar can be picked up by the opponents. On the basis of this observation, the opponents 
would get to the objective using a gap in the forward line of SAM sites. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Positions of Patriot SAM sites (triangles within circles) and the objective (red circle) in the 
west configuration. Note that most of the SAM sites are located along an imaginary line with a 
gap between number 4 and 5. SAM sites 7, 8 and 9 are SAM traps. 
 
To combat the opponent, the pilot’s aircraft was equipped with one air-to-air missile. With this 
missile, the pilot should be able to eliminate one opponent. The reason the pilot does not get 
                                                                
1 Usually, fighter missions are flown in formations of at least two ships on each side. However, for the sake of model 
simplicity (individual models not addressing team aspects) the task was simplified to a single ship mission. 
 
 
 
An Evaluation of Cognitive Models for Surprise and Situation Awareness in a Flight Simulator 
with Fighter Pilots 
 
  
 
20 | NLR-TP-2013-192   
 
more missiles is to force him to use the SAM traps. The pilot should eliminate the other opponent 
by luring the agent into a so-called SAM trap. This trap consists of a SAM site that remains hidden 
by keeping its radar deactivated, so that the agent cannot pick up its radiation and detect its 
location. When the opponent agent flies within the weapon range of the SAM site, the SAM 
operator (a simple agent) is notified by the ground radar of this fact. The SAM site agent 
subsequently activates its radar and fires a missile at the opponent agent. 
The F-16 pilot takes-off from an airfield nearby the opponents’ objective. The two virtual 
opponents start mid-air near the gap in the SAM defence.  
The participant is informed of the position, direction, speed and altitude by a friendly ground-
based radar station. 
 
3.3 Equipment 
The participants interacted with the simulated environment through a mock-up of an actual F-16 
cockpit. This cockpit is equipped with realistic F-16 avionics, realistic in form, fit and function by 
means of a touchscreen, with which a large part of the functionality of the actual avionics can be 
accessed. Three projectors provide a 60
o
 horizontal by 30
o
 vertical Field-of-View for the outside 
view of the cockpit. 
The agent implementations were coupled to a dedicated agent simulation environment called 
STAGE. The approach for this coupling has been outlined in [10]. The virtual aircraft the agents 
controlled had dedicated models for sensors, air-to-air missiles and the platform itself. 
The two agents used in the evaluation used identical implementations of the integrated 
SA/surprise model, as well as a simple decision making module. Decision making was determined 
by coupling certain behaviours to the activity level of high-level present and future beliefs in the 
belief graph (see fig. 3) and to the surprise intensity. 
The default behaviour of the agents was to fly towards the objective. To make the scenario more 
challenging for the participants, the agents would fly along two different paths. If an agent’s 
future belief is that an air-to-air missile impact is imminent, it would start evasive manoeuvres. A 
different kind of defensive manoeuvring and the use of chaff were executed if an agent believes a 
SAM missile impact is imminent. This defensive manoeuvre was less effective and slower if the 
surprise intensity was high: a SAM trap would kill the agent because of this, while a regular SAM 
site did not. Finally, if an agent believes that the participant had run out of missiles, it would 
attack the human pilot. This represents that the agent knows that without missiles or other 
weapons, the participant is an easy target. Because of this behaviour, the participant could lure 
the remaining agent into a SAM trap. 
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Fig. 3: Belief graph used for SA in the evaluation. Each belief/observation has a label, 
initial activation value and time label. 
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3.4 Procedure 
The evaluation took place during four days, either in the morning or afternoon, four hours per 
participant, distributed over two weeks.  Individual participants were informed on the general 
purpose of the tests, that is, the evaluation of intelligent, human-like virtual opponents, but were 
not informed about the specific models (SA and surprise-generation) or any other details about 
the internal processes of the opponents. Before the evaluation started, individual participants 
also received a briefing concerning the mission objective and parameters of the five sorties. The 
briefing can be found in appendix A. The initial conditions of the five trials were all identical. 
However, the first trial was a familiarization trial. 
After each of the remaining four trials, the geometry of all starting positions, SAMs, etcetera 
were rotated by ninety degrees, so that the agents’ direction of approach was from the north, 
east, south and west. The reason for this rotation of the scenario elements is to aid the 
participants in remembering (the differences between) individual trials, which is necessary for 
answering the post-experiment questionnaire. 
In each trial, a different agent configuration was used. Two aspects were varied: full and reduced 
SA and active and inactive surprise. With full SA, all the beliefs indicated in fig. 2 were updated in 
each update cycle. With reduced SA, half of all the beliefs for each phase were updated. With 
active surprise, the model would work as intended. With inactive surprise, the surprise intensity 
was set at zero regardless of issues like unexpectedness. 
The familiarization trial used full SA and inactive surprise agent settings, because these settings 
provide a baseline in realism of behaviour. The other four parameter configurations were applied 
in random order to minimize order effects. 
Each trial took approximately twenty minutes, after which the participant completed a 
questionnaire concerning the agents’ behaviour: the exact form can be found in appendix B.  
After all five trials, the participant filled in a post-experiment questionnaire as detailed in 
appendix B regarding his opinion on the agents’ behaviour on the whole. 
 
3.5 Expectations 
The expected evaluation by the participants would be as follows: 
1) The rating for to which extent the opponents (the two agents) were surprised will be 
higher with the surprise model activated than with the model deactivated. 
2) The rating for to which extent the opponent showed good SA will be higher in the trials 
in which the agents had full SA compared to those in which the agents’ SA was reduced 
to half. 
3) The tactical expertise rating would be highest for the trials with full SA, surprise 
deactivated, lowest for the trials with reduced SA, surprise activated. This is expected 
because reducing SA and introducing surprised behaviour are both reducing the 
effectiveness of the agents in fulfilling their mission. The ratings for the two other 
settings would lie between these two extremes. 
4) The rating for behaviour realism would be highest with reduced SA, surprise activated, 
lowest for full SA, surprise deactivated, as the reduced SA and surprised behaviour are 
explicitly modelled after human cognitive processes. Again, the ratings for the two other 
settings would lie between these two extremes. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Post-trial questionnaire 
Fig. 4 shows the average evaluations of the post-trial questions. 
What can be observed from Fig. 4d is that the participant in general agreed that the opponent 
had the same quality of situation awareness, regardless of whether the model had full or reduced 
SA. This is unexpected, as the expectation was the full/reduced setting for the agent’s SA would 
receive different ratings. 
The participants observed the largest difference in the extent to which opponents showed to be 
surprised between an active and deactivated surprise model. In fig. 4c, the ratings for having 
surprise activated (first and last bar) are much higher than when the surprise module was 
deactivated.  
The evaluation of the agent’s realism is medium for most configurations, with a bit higher value 
for the agents with full SA and the surprise model activated. According to comments of the 
participants, they judged behaviour indicating sound tactical reasoning as the most realistic 
behaviour, which differs from the stated expectations. 
Surprisingly, this does not match with fig. 4a, the ratings for the level of the opponents’ tactical 
expertise. There is no connection between the level of tactical expertise and full/reduced SA or to 
the level of tactical expertise and surprise activated/deactivated. 
 
Fig. 4: Average ratings of post-trial questions (on a scale of 0-10). 
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4.2 Post-experiment Questionnaire 
Fig. 5 shows the rating for each of the post-experiment questions. Along the horizontal axis, the 
measurements per participant (no. 1 to 4) are grouped. Along the vertical axis, the ‘agreement-
ratings’ (1 to 6) for the three statements (see the legend) are plotted. An agreement rating of 1 
corresponds with ‘I strongly disagree’ and an agreement rating of 6 corresponds with ‘I strong 
agree’ (see the post-experiment questionnaire in appendix B).   
 
 
Fig. 5: Ratings of post-experiment questions. 
 
Based on the post-experiment ratings, three observations can be made: 
First, three out of the four participants agreed that they would like to use the opponent used in 
the evaluation more frequently in training, while the other participant was merely neutral on 
this.  
Second, three out of the four participants agreed that the opponent behaved in the same fashion 
as human opponents, however the third participant disagreed. 
Third, no consensus between the participants can be found on whether the events of the trials 
were surprising to them. 
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With this type of opponents I
would be able to fly the
scenarios in the same fashion
as in simulations with human-
controlled opponents.
During the engagements, I was 
surprised to observe an event I 
didn’t expect. 
I think that I would like to use
such opponents  frequently in
training
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5 Discussion 
Because of the small number of participants, no statistically significant results can be obtained 
from the evaluation. Still, some interesting insights can be obtained, as the participants are all 
subject matter experts in a complex domain. 
Overall, the participants were positive on the practical usefulness of the agents in the evaluation. 
As the post-experiment question ratings show, most of the participants found the agents quite 
realistic and would like to train with such agents. In that regard the evaluation is positive and can 
be seen as an encouragement for further research and development of the model. 
The questionnaire results also show that the participants seem to perceive the agents with an 
active surprise model to be surprised by unexpected events more so than with the surprise 
model deactivated
2
. However, the participants did not perceive any noticeable difference in the 
agents’ quality of SA, whether or not the agents had full or reduced SA. There is also little 
difference between the ratings for the level of expertise and realism exhibited by the agents. 
There are some explanations for these last findings. One reason is that while there are major 
differences in the mental state between trials with full SA and with reduced SA, these differences 
were not very pronounced in the resulting behaviour. This is because of the relative simplicity of 
the decision making model the agents used, which did not generate widely different behaviours 
between differing inputs from the SA model. Perhaps with a more sophisticated decision making 
model, the nuances of the SA model would be more observable by human opponents. 
Another reason is that the participants had very different interpretations of the same kind of 
behaviour of the agent. They also regularly attributed different reasons for some behaviours. This 
is probably due to the fact that in the scenario, the range of possible actions is relatively small, 
while the range of possible reasons for these actions is much larger. Therefore there are many 
interpretations for a given behaviour. Related to this is the fact that each of the participants used 
very different tactics
3
 which in turn changes the overall course of the scenario and thus the 
perception of the scenario by the participant. For example, one participant used a very aggressive 
tactic which limited the time in which the agents could display their behaviour, while another 
participant was very defensive and could observe the whole range of behaviours the agents could 
exhibit. 
A third reason for the small differences in ratings might be that the least experienced participant 
gave identical ratings for all post-trial questions for all trials. With only four participants, these 
identical ratings have a great impact in reducing differences between trials.  
In future research, the integration with a more sophisticated decision making model could 
improve the realism of the behaviour as perceived by subject matter experts. Another topic for 
further research is additional evaluation of the integrated model with an improved evaluation 
and scenario design based on lessons learned.   
  
                                                                
2 ‘Surprised behaviour’ and ‘level of expertise’ were informally defined. No specific behavioural markers were used. 
3 The participants were deliberately left free in their choice for tactics, which could be e.g. be more aggressive or 
defensive, see also appendix A.  
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Appendix A Briefing of participants 
used for evaluation 
  
Appendix A.1 Briefing 
WARNING: These scenarios are part of a research project. You will fly a 1v1 scenario, and this 
may not be entirely realistic. After successful validation, the scenarios will be extended to more 
realistic 2v2 and 4v4 scenarios. 
 
Appendix A.1.1 Mission Objective 
It is wartime. You have the DCA mission to defend the objective (obj) against air threats that seek 
to destroy it. You will start the mission in a CAP between the FLOT and the objective. Instead of 
starting at a runway, the simulation starts with your aircraft airborne, to reduce mission time. 
Your initial task is to fly a CAP at high altitude (5000 ft) and slow speed (~0.8M) when facing the 
FLOT and at high speed (~1.2M) when on the return leg, so as to maximise search time. The 
centre of the CAP is positioned at approximately 60 NM from the objective; the lengths of the 
legs are approximately 15 NM.  
When an enemy aircraft crosses the FLOT, you have permission to engage it. Return to the CAP 
when the enemy is neutralized or leaves the area. 
 
Appendix A.1.2 Friendly Capabilities 
Beside your ship, a number of friendly SAMs (Patriots, indicated with Pa on your HSD) defend the 
area against air threats. Most of them are aligned along the FLOT to form a SAM belt. Their 
locations are very likely known to the enemy. Because the SAM radars are continuously active, 
their locations can also be picked by the RWR of enemy intruders. 
However, some of the SAM units are initially hidden from the start and their position is unknown 
to the enemy. These SAMs are referred to as SAM traps (indicated with Pa* on your HSD). Their 
radar is not active until an aircraft comes within missile range. When an enemy aircraft 
approaches the missile range of the SAM trap, the SAM unit will be informed by the friendly GCI 
radar.  After the enemy aircraft enters the missile range, the SAM trap radar becomes active and 
missiles will be launched.  
All SAM units have good IFF capabilities and will only fire on enemy aircraft: it is save for you to 
fly within SAM range. 
-  SAMs are Patriots with Range 18000 m (not entirely realistic) 
-  You are armed with only two AMRAAMs.  
-  You should launch two AMRAAMs at a single target. However, in order to be able to 
continue the mission, you should preferably use the SAM traps to neutralize enemy fighters 
that approach the objective (obj). 
-  No fuel considerations for the F-16. 
-  You may dispense chaff as required. 
-  The area in which the GCI radar can track targets is approximately 60x40 NM. 
-  GCI uses Link-16 to communicate target positions with the F-16. 
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Appendix A.1.3 Enemy characteristics (Intel) 
Intel tells us that it is highly unlikely that the enemy will execute a fighter sweep in this area. You 
can assume that any enemies crossing the FLOT will intend to attack the objective (obj), since it is 
the only probable target in the area.  
However, because the enemy does not know the location or even the existence of the SAM traps 
until these become active, the enemy will most likely be unprepared for any encounter with a 
SAM trap. Therefore, it is likely that the enemy will have more difficulty defeating a SAM trap 
than a normal SAM. 
It is advised that you use this information to you advantage: luring the enemy into a SAM trap 
will lead to a highly probable kill of the enemy by the SAM. 
-  Possible threats: multiple Su-27 fighter aircraft passing the FLOT 
-  Su-27 pilots can become aware of the F-16 through radar or RWR.  
-  No fuel considerations for Su-27s.  
-  Su-27s are possibly armed with a restricted number of AA-10c Alamo missiles.  
-  Su-27s may dispense chaff 
 
Appendix A.1.4 Rules of engagement 
-  You are not allowed to engage enemy aircraft until these have crossed the FLOT / passed the 
SAM belt. 
-  Weapon parameters dictate you need to use two AMRAAMs to reliably neutralize a single 
target. 
-  You are not allowed to cross the FLOT. 
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Appendix A.2 Trial 1: western SAM belt 
 
Patriots 1 through 6 form the SAM belt. 
Patriots 7, 8 and 9 are SAM traps. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
An Evaluation of Cognitive Models for Surprise and Situation Awareness in a Flight Simulator 
with Fighter Pilots 
 
  
 
30 | NLR-TP-2013-192   
 
Appendix A.3 Trial 2: Northern SAM belt 
 
Patriots 1 through 6 form the SAM belt. 
Patriots 7, 8 and 9 are SAM traps. 
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Appendix A.4 Trial 3: Eastern SAM belt 
 
Patriots 1 through 6 form the SAM belt. 
Patriots 7, 8 and 9 are SAM traps. 
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Appendix A.5 Trial 4: Southern SAM belt 
 
Patriots 1 through 6 form the SAM belt. 
Patriots 7, 8 and 9 are SAM traps. 
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Appendix B Questionnaire  used for 
evaluation 
 
Pre-experiment Questionnaire 
 
Name: Date: 
 
Please answer the questions in the order in which they are presented.  
Note: 
All the individual data that are collected during this test, including the responses to the questions 
of this questionnaire, will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. Once this questionnaire has 
been filled in, only members of the analysis team will be allowed to see it.  
 
1 -  What is your age? 
 
   (years of age) 
 
2 -  For how many years have you been a fighter pilot? 
 
  (years) 
 
 
3 -  Have you previously taken part in any real-time evaluation/simulation? 
 
 Yes     No 
 
4 -  If you replied "Yes" to the previous question:  
Which evaluation/simulation did you take part in and what was your role? 
 
 
 
 
 
Smart Bandits is an ongoing project and still under development. 
Thank you in advance! 
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 Smart Bandits Behaviour - Post-Trial Questionnaire  
 
Date/Time:  
Trial ID: 1 
 
– Please indicate your report mark, in the range of 0 (of no use) to 10 (excellent), for the 
capabilities of the opponents. 
– Only the behaviour of the opponents should be considered in your answers, no other 
features of the simulation. 
 
Report Mark [0-
10] 
1. Level of tactical expertise of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
2. Level of realism of the behaviour of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
 
3. The extent to which the opponents showed to be surprised by the 
course of events 
 
Comment: 
 
4. The extent to which the opponents showed good situation awareness 
 
Comment: 
 
5. Can you indicate how the behaviour of the opponents did affect your decisions during 
the scenario? 
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Smart Bandits Behaviour - Post-Trial Questionnaire  
 
Date/Time:  
Trial ID: 2 
 
– Please indicate your report mark, in the range of 0 (of no use) to 10 (excellent), for the 
capabilities of the opponents. 
– Only the behaviour of the opponents should be considered in your answers, no other 
features of the simulation. 
 
Report Mark [0-
10] 
1. Level of tactical expertise of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
2. Level of realism of the behaviour of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
 
3. The extent to which the opponents showed to be surprised by the 
course of events 
 
Comment: 
 
4. The extent to which the opponents showed good situation awareness 
 
Comment: 
 
5. Can you indicate how the behaviour of the opponents did affect your decisions during 
the scenario? 
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Smart Bandits Behaviour - Post-Trial Questionnaire  
 
Date/Time:  
Trial ID: 3 
 
– Please indicate your report mark, in the range of 0 (of no use) to 10 (excellent), for the 
capabilities of the opponents. 
– Only the behaviour of the opponents should be considered in your answers, no other 
features of the simulation. 
 
Report Mark [0-
10] 
1. Level of tactical expertise of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
2. Level of realism of the behaviour of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
 
3. The extent to which the opponents showed to be surprised by the 
course of events 
 
Comment: 
 
4. The extent to which the opponents showed good situation awareness 
 
Comment: 
 
5. Can you indicate how the behaviour of the opponents did affect your decisions during 
the scenario? 
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Smart Bandits Behaviour - Post-Trial Questionnaire  
 
Date/Time:  
Trial ID: 4 
 
– Please indicate your report mark, in the range of 0 (of no use) to 10 (excellent), for the 
capabilities of the opponents. 
– Only the behaviour of the opponents should be considered in your answers, no other 
features of the simulation. 
 
Report Mark [0-
10] 
1. Level of tactical expertise of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
2. Level of realism of the behaviour of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
 
3. The extent to which the opponents showed to be surprised by the 
course of events 
 
Comment: 
 
4. The extent to which the opponents showed good situation awareness 
 
Comment: 
 
5. Can you indicate how the behaviour of the opponents did affect your decisions during 
the scenario? 
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Smart Bandits Behaviour - Post-Trial Questionnaire  
 
Date/Time:  
Trial ID: 5 
 
– Please indicate your report mark, in the range of 0 (of no use) to 10 (excellent), for the 
capabilities of the opponents. 
– Only the behaviour of the opponents should be considered in your answers, no other 
features of the simulation. 
 
Report Mark [0-
10] 
1. Level of tactical expertise of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
2. Level of realism of the behaviour of the opponents in the scenario 
 
Comment: 
 
3. The extent to which the opponents showed to be surprised by the 
course of events 
 
Comment: 
 
4. The extent to which the opponents showed good situation awareness 
 
Comment: 
 
5. Can you indicate how the behaviour of the opponents did affect your decisions during 
the scenario? 
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Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
 
– This questionnaire should only be completed once, after all validation trials. 
– For each hypothesis we would like to know your personal opinion, i.e. to what extent you 
agree with a particular hypothesis (answers range from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 6 “Strongly 
agree”).  Please base your answers on the experiences you gained during the validation 
trials. 
– If you want to provide additional comments and/or explanations you can use the indicated 
areas. We firmly encourage additional comments for the hypothesis with which you 
(strongly) agree or (strongly) disagree. 
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1. With this type of opponents I would be able to 
fly the scenarios in the same fashion as in 
simulations with human-controlled opponentss. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Comment: 
 
 
2. During the engagements, I was surprised to 
observe an event I didn’t expect. 
Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Comment: 
 
 
3. I think that I would like to use such opponents  
frequently in training 
Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο Ο 
Comment: 
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4. Based on your current experience with these Smart Bandits, which future developments 
would you like to see added or changed? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Do you have suggestions for improvement of the current experiment? 
 
 More experimental runs 
 Evaluate specific features that were not (or not sufficiently) evaluated this time 
 Other (please add)… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
W H A T  I S  N L R ?  
 
The  NLR  i s  a  D utc h o rg an i s at io n th at  i de n t i f i es ,  d ev e lop s  a n d a p pl i es  h i gh -t ech  know l ed g e i n  t he  
aero s pac e sec tor .  Th e NLR ’s  ac t i v i t i es  ar e  soc ia l ly  r e lev an t ,  m ar ke t -or i en ta te d ,  an d co n d uct ed  
not- for - p rof i t .  I n  t h i s ,  th e  NLR  s erv e s  to  bo ls te r  th e gove r nm en t ’s  i n nova t iv e  c apa b i l i t ie s ,  w h i l e  
a lso  p romot i ng  t he  i n nova t iv e  a n d com p et i t iv e  ca pa c i t ie s  o f  i t s  p ar tn er  com pa ni e s .  
 
The NLR,  renowned for its leading expert ise,  professional  approach and independent consultancy,  is  
staffed by c l ient-orientated personnel who are not only highly ski l led and educated,  but also 
continuously strive to develop and improve their  competencies. The NL R moreover possesses an 
impressive array of  high qual ity research faci l i t ies.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
